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Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2a3(2)(h) (1988).

Nature of Proceedings
The proceeding in the trial court was on a petition by plaintiff for an
Order to Show Cause why defendant should not be ordered to pay plaintiff one-half
of his gross military retirement pay as ordered by the divorce decree pursuant to a
stipulation between the parties.

The Domestic Commissioner recommended that

defendant pay one-half of his "disposable" retirement income as defined by federal
statute.

Upon plaintiffs objection, the matter was reviewed by the Honorable

Kenneth Rigtrup who ordered that defendant pay one-half of his gross retirement
income as ordered in the original decree and that defendant pay $1,419.00 representing the back amount due for the difference between the gross and "disposable"
retirement income. Defendant has appealed this order.

Statement of Issues
There are two similar, but distinct issues presented on appeal.

(1)

Does the trial court have jurisdiction to award the plaintiff spouse more than onehalf of the disposable retirement income of defendant or has the issue been totally
pre-empted by federal statute?

(2) Where the parties agreed by stipulation that

plaintiff would be paid one-half of the gross retirement income, is the trial court
precluded from enforcing the original decree entered on the basis of the stipulation?

3

Determinative Statutes
The statute, the interpretation of which is determinative of this matter,
is 10 U.S.C. § 1408. This statute is reproduced in its entirety in the Addendum.

Statement of the Case
Plaintiff accepts appellant/defendant's statement of the case.

Summary of the Argument
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act grants state
courts the power to treat a retiree's disposable retirement pay as marital property to
be dealt with according to the laws of the state having jurisdiction. According to the
laws of the State of Utah, the trial court has broad discretion in distribution of
marital property. While there is a limit to the amount of retirement income which
the services will pay directly to the former spouse, there is no statutory or federal
case law limitation on the amount of retirement income which the state court may,
in exercise of its discretionary powers, award to the former spouse.
Defendant entered into a valid, enforceable stipulation which provided
for payment of one-half of his gross retirement income to plaintiff.

The original

divorce decree was entered based upon this stipulation. Defendant cannot, without
timely notice and evidence of good cause, avoid responsibility for this payment.
The trial court's actions in adjusting the property interests of the parties
are entitled to a presumption of validity and, absent a showing of clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, should not be overturned on appeal.

4

Argument
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ENTIRE "DISPOSABLE" RETIREMENT
INCOME IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION AND
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACCORDING
TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. THERE IS
NO STATUTORY LIMITATION ON THE AMOUNT OF
THE 'DISPOSABLE" RETIREMENT INCOME WHICH
THE TRIAL COURT CAN AWARD TO PLAINTIFF.
Section 1408 of Title 10, U.S.C. grants state courts authority to award
a former spouse part of a former serviceman's retirement income. The legislation
provides, in part:
Subject to the limitations of this section, a
court may treat disposable retired or retainer
pay payable to a member for pay periods
beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of
the member and his spouse in accordance with
the law of the jurisdiction of such court.
10 U.S.C § 1408(c)(1).

Disposable retirement pay is defined at 10 U.S.C. §

1408(a)(4). Plaintiff concedes that a reasonable reading of the statute grants the trial
court jurisdiction only over defendant's disposable retirement income as defined by
the act.
Congress expressly granted state courts authority to treat all of the disposable retirement pay as marital property. The only restriction expressed in the act
is the limitation of authority to disposable income. There is no express or implied
condition imposing upon the trial court a limited authority over only 50% of the
disposable income.

5

Section 1408(d) deals with direct payments by the government to the
former spouse. The following subsection (e) states:
The total amount of the disposable retired or
retainer pay of a member payable under
subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of
such disposable retired or retainer pay.
10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(1). These sections expressly limit the amount of direct payment
by the government directly to the former spouse. They do not impose a limitation
on the amount of marital property, i.e. "disposable retired or retainer pay", which the
state court may award to the former spouse.
Defendant cites the recent case of Mansell v. Mansell 490 US

;

109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) for the proposition that the trial court may
not award an amount based upon the retiree's gross retirement pay.

In fact, the

holding in Mansell is very narrow. The question addressed by the court is whether
the court may exercise jurisdiction over retirement income which has been voluntarily
waived by the retiree in order to accept disability payments. Noting that reductions
for disability payments are included in the definition of "disposable retired or retainer
pay" and that "under the Act's plain and precise language, state courts have been
granted the authority to treat disposable retire pay as community property", Mansell
at 109 S.Ct. 2028, the Supreme Court held that the state court had no authority over
the amounts voluntarily waived.

The Mansell decision did not affect the clearly

stated proposition that the state trial courts may treat the entire disposable amount
as marital property "in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court."
Defendant also relies upon Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah App

6

1988) for the proposition that plaintiff is prevented from receiving more than 50% of
his disposable, retirement income. In Greene, the modification ordered by the court
was based upon an agreement between attorneys for the parties.

Greene at 829.

The Greene court merely approved the modification as "correction of a mistake" and
did not hold that the attorneys' interpretation of federal law was, in fact, correct.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has examined this question in a case
with facts essentially the same as the ones before this court. In Deliduka v. Deliduka,
347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn App 1984) the appellant challenged the award of 50% of his
gross retirement income to his former wife. In Deliduka. the trial court attempted
to order direct government payments of one half of the gross retirement income. The
appellate court concluded:
A fair reading shows that the act grants the
authority to treat all disposable retired pay as
marital property, but limits direct government
payments to former spouses to 50 percent of
disposable retired pay (65 percent for multiple
court orders). This means that a state court
wishing to award a former spouse more than
50 percent of disposable retired pay must
order direct government payments and payments by the member of the military to his
spouse.
Deliduka at 55, emphasis in original.

The Minnesota court held in favor of the

spouse and observed, "The trial court erred only in its method of disbursing pension
payments to the wife." Id. at 56.
In Utah, when dealing with military retirement pay, an equal split of the
distributable portion between the spouses is not mandatory.

7

For example, if the

retired spouse "has retained an inequitable share of the marital assets, the court may
divide the retirement as it sees fit." Maxwell v. Maxwell 754 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah App
1988) citing Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), emphasis added.
In the present case, as in Deliduka. it was the intent of the court to
award plaintiff one-half of the gross retirement income. The trial court properly has
jurisdiction over the disposable amount and, to the extent the entire disposable
amount will support the award of one-half of the gross benefits, the court acted
correctly within its discretion.

Defendant has not appropriately challenged the

discretion of the court in making the award.
POINT II
DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO A VALID, ENFORCEABLE STIPULATION UPON WHICH THE DIVORCE
DECREE WAS ENTERED. DEFENDANT, HAVING
FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY TO THE COURT FOR
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE AND PROVIDE
EVIDENCE OF GOOD CAUSE MUST BE BOUND BY
THE STIPULATED DECREE.
The original decree in this matter was ordered based upon a stipulation
of the parties. Defendant knew what he was agreeing to, entered into a valid stipulation, and cannot now escape his responsibilities based upon a tenuous technicality.
A valid and binding stipulation exists where (1) the parties have completed their negotiations, (2) the agreement is reduced to writing, and (3) the agreement is signed and filed with the clerk or read into the record before the court.
Brown v. Brown. 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App 1987). A valid stipulation is conclusive and binding "unless, upon timely notice and for good cause shown, relief is
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granted therefrom."

Higlev v. McDonald. 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984).

Such

stipulations are also binding in divorce proceedings. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d
820, 832-33 (Utah App. 1989).
Where the stipulation of the parties gives rise to a division of property
which is equitable, the court "cannot presume that had the [trial] court made the
division, it would have fallen into error." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 309
(Utah 1988). Though the stipulation of the parties is not necessarily binding upon
the court, it is usually followed unless the court finds it to be unfair or unreasonable.
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App 1987). The trial court "may refuse
to enforce an agreement upon a specific finding as to why the agreement should not
be followed. . . In its findings, the trial court must therefore clearly articulate these
reasons for disregarding the stipulation." Colman at 789, emphasis added.
Defendant entered into a valid and binding stipulation. He has made
no effort to procedurally obtain modification of the stipulation based decree by
proper notice and showing of good cause. Defendant clearly stipulated and intended
that his former wife receive one-half of his gross military retirement benefits. Absent
a showing of good cause, defendant should continue to be bound by his stipulation.
The trial court, therefore, acted properly in holding defendant responsible for that
amount.
POINT III
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE TRIAL COURT HAS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN AWARDING PROPERTY
INTERESTS AND IS ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION
OF VALIDITY. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW
9

CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURTS DETERMINATION
SHOULD STAND.
"It is well established that in divorces the trial courts are given considerable discretion in adjusting the parties' financial and property interests, and their
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.11 Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123,
124 (Utah App 1987). See also Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 122
(Utah App 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has taken a similar position:
In dividing the marital estate, the trial court
can enter such orders concerning property and
alimony as are equitable. Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5 (1987). In making such orders, the trial
court is permitted broad latitude, and its
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long
as it exercises its discretion in accordance with
the standards set by this Court, [citations
omitted] It is therefore incumbent on the
appealing party to prove that the trial court's
division violates these standards. . ."
Newmever v. Newmever. 748 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). The trial court's actions
are granted a presumption of validity and, "Absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with an alimony or property award.11
Throckmorton at 122.
Defendant has failed to show clear and prejudicial abuse of the trial
court's discretion. The order of the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed.

Conclusion
The trial court is clearly granted authority to treat the entire disposable
retirement income of defendant as marital property according to the laws of the State
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of Utah. There is no limitation, up to the maximum disposable amount, which the
court may distribute equitably between the parties. The trial court may, in reasonable exercise of its discretion, award plaintiff a larger share of the retirement income
than defendant.
If the trial court erred, it was in the insignificant area of ordering that
plaintiff be paid 50% of the gross retirement benefits directly by the government. It
properly should have ordered the direct payment of 50% of the disposable amount
and payment by defendant of the difference between that amount and 50% of the
gross amount.
Defendant has failed either to show grounds why he should not be
bound by his stipulation or that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in making
the property award.
The order of the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed to the extent
that it awards plaintiff one-half of the gross amount of defendant's retirement income.
The trial court should be instructed to amend its order to provide that defendant pay
plaintiff the difference between half of the disposable amount and half of the gross
amount.
Respectfully submitted this *T ^day^Qf September, 1989.

^^"^\

David A. McPhie
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that, on the &

day of September, 1989, I caused to

be mailed four (4) copies of Respondent's Brief, postage prepaid, to:
Franklin L. Slaugh
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
9341 S. 1300 East
Sandy, Utah 84094

David A. McPhie
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Addendum
1.

10 U.S.C. § 1408 - Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders.

2.

Deliduka v. Deliduka. 347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn App 1984).
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GENERAL'IMILITARY L A W SUBT* A

( 0 In the case of a member who is retired under any section of title 14,
the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of
monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36 months (whether
or not consecutive) of active duty as a member of a uniformed service.
(g) In the case of a member whose retired pay is computed under section
16 of the Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned Officers* Act of 1948
(33 U.S.C 853o), the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the
total amount of monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36
months (whether or not consecutive) of active puty as a member of a uniformed service.
(h) In the case of a member who is retired under section 210(g) or 211(a)
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and 212(a)), the monthly
retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of monthly basic pay
which the member received for any 36 months '(whether or not consecutive)
of active duty as a member of a uniformed service.
(Added Pub.L. 96-342, Title VIII, § 813(a)(1), Sejjt. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100, and
amended Pub.L. 96-513, Title I, § 113(c), Title V,||j§§ 501(21), 511(53), Dec. 12,
1980. 94 Stat. 2877. 2908, 2925.)

CH. U

COMPUTATION OF RETIRED PAY

Higher retired pay for members of Navy or Marine Corps who serve satisfactorily under temporary appointments, see section 6151 of this title.
Recomputatton of retired pay to reflect advancement on retired list—
Air Force, see section 8992 of this title.
Army1, see section 3992 of this title.
Retainee Jay of member transferred to Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve when not
on, active duty, see sectionj6330 of this title.
Retired grade and pay of—
]
Enlisted members of Regular'Navy or Marine Corps with thirty or more years of service.
I see section 6326 of this title.
Officers with forty and thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps or retired
I while serving as admiral, vice admiral, general, or lieutenant general by virtue of
I temporary appointment, see section 6325 of this title
Officers with thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6322 of
j this title
;
Officers with twenty years of service in Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6323 of this
1

title

Retired pay of regular officers of Navy or Marine Corps designated for limited duty—
In grades of lieutenant commander in Navy and of major in Marine Corps for failure of
1
selection for promotion, sec section 6383 of this title.
Upon completion of thirty years of service, see section 6383 of this title.

Armed Services <£=>23.4.
Historical Note
References lit Text. Section 16 of the
Subsec. fdXl). Pub.L 96-513, § 501(21),
Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned substituted,!*'or 6383" for "6381, 6383, 6390,
Officers' Act of 1948 (33 U.S.C 853o), re- 6394. 639& 6398. or 6400".
fcrrcd to in subsec. (g), U section 16 of Act
Effective Date of 1980 Amendment.
June 3, 1948. c. 390. 62 Stat. 299. which is Amendment by sections 113(c) and 501(21)
classified to section 853o of Title 33, Naviga- o f pUD.L. 06-SS3 effective Sept. S3, $981, but
lion »nd Navigable Waters.
t h c tu! honty to prescribe regulations under
Section 210(g) and 211(a) of the Public the amendment by section 113(c) of Pub.L.
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and 96-513 effective on Dec. 12, 1980, see section
212(a)), referred to in subsec. (h). are sections 701 of PublL. 96-513. set out as an Effective
210(g) and 211(a) of Act July 1, 1944, c. 373. Date of 1980 Amendment note under section
Title II. 58 Stat. 687. 688, which are classified
101 of this title.
to sections 211(g) and 212(a) of Title 42, The
Amendment by section 511(53) of Pub.L.
Public Health and Welfare, respectively.
9 6 _ 5 l 3 effective Dec. 12. 1980, see section
1980 Amendment. Subsec. (a)(1). Pub.L. 701(b)(3) of1 Pub.L. 96-513, set out as an Ef96-513. § 511(53). substituted "after Septem* fective Date of 1980 Amendment note under
ber 7. 1980" for "on or after the date of the section 101 of this title,
enactment of the Department of Defense AuLegislative History. For legislative history
thonzation Act, 1981".
a n d p u r p o s e 0 f P u b .L. 96-342, see 1980 U.S.
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub.L. 96-513, § 113(c), Code Cong, and Adm.Ncws. p. 2612. Sec,
added references to sections 633, 634, 635, also, Pub.L. 96-513. 1980 U.S. Code Cong.
636. and 1251.
and Adm.Ncws, p. 6333.
Cross References
Computation of retired pay of personnel of—
Air Force, see section 8991 of this title.
Army, see section 3991 of this title.
Coast Guard, see section 423 ot Title 14, Coast Guard.,"
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, see section 853o of Title 33, Navigatton and Navigable Waters.
»l«
Computation of retired pay of personnel of Public Health $<rvice—
Commissioned officers, see section 212 of Title 42, The^ Public Health and Welfare.
Officers of Regular Corps in full grade twice failing selection for promotion, see section
&
211 of Title 42.
186
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§

1408.

Library References
CJ.S. Armed Services §§ 80. 114 to 120.

P a y m e n t of retired o r retainer pay in compliance with
c o u r t orders

(a)

In this section:
(1) "Court" mcans-f(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands;
(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of
title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and
( O any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country
with which the United States has an agreement requiring the United States to honor any court order of such country.

(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified,
or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a
fina^l decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered,
ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously
issued decree), which—
!
(A) is issued in {accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of
j'j'that court;
(B) provides for—
(i) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b)));
187
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GENERAL jKlILITARY LAW SUBT. A

CH. 71 COMPUTATION OF RETIRED PAY

the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested;

(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of (he
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 66i(c))); or
(Hi) division of property (including a division of community
property); and

(B) the court order is regular on its face;
(Q the court order or other documents served with the court
order identify the member concerned and include the social security number of such member, and
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court
[order certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and
Sailors* Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.App. 501 et seq.) were
observed; and
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order—
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;

1

( O specifically provides for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or 3S a percentage of disposable reiired or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member to
the spouse or former spouse of that member.
(3) "Final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for
taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a
decree from which timely appeal has been |taken and such appeal has
been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.
(4) "Disposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled (other than the
retired pay of a member retired for disability under chapter 61 of this
title) less amounts which—
(A) are owed by that member to the. United States;
(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired
or retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures ordered by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts
waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38;
( O are properly withheld for Federal; State, or local income tax
purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is authorized or required by law and to the extent such amounts withheld are not
greater than would be authorized if sucn member claimed all dependents to which he was entitled;
';
(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 34020)) if such'member presents evidence
of a tax obligation which supports such: withholding:
(E) are deducted as Government life.insurance premiums (not
including amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or
(F) are deducted because of an election, under chapter 73 of this
title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom
payment of a portion of such member's retired or retainer pay is
being made pursuant to a court order under this section.
(5) "Member" includes a former member.
(6) "Spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former
husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date
of a court order, was married to that member.
(b) For the purposes of this section—
(1) service of a court order is effective if—
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated
for receipt of service of court orders under regulations prescribed
pursuant to subsection (h) or, if no agen,{ has been so designated,
188
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(B) is legal in form; and
(C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice
that it is issued without authority of law.
(c)(1), Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning
after June 25, 1981, cither as property solely of the member or as property
of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction
of such court.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or
otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse or former
spouse. !
(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply
for retirement or retire at a! particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section.
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member in the manner described in paragraph (I) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of
military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court.
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order
with respect to the payment of a portion of the retired or retainer pay of a
member, to the spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary
shall, subject to the limitations of this section, make payments to the spouse
or former spouse in the amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of
the member specifically prbvided for in the court order. In the case of a
memberjentitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective
service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days
after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to
receive jretired or retainer .pay on the date of the effective service of the
court order, such payments shall begin not. later than 90 days after the date
on which the member first becomes entitled to receive retired or retainer
pay.
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(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whon> payments are to be made
under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years
or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service
creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay,
payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include
an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of
disposable retired or retainer pay of the member as property of the member
or property of the member and his spouse.
(3) Payments under this section shall not be {made more frequently than
once each month, and the Secretary concerned snail not be required to vary
normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired Jor retainer pay in order to
comply with a court order.
(4) Payments from the disposable retired orj retainer pay of a member
pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the
applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are being made, whichever occurs first.
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of
property (including a division of community property) in addition to an
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall,
subject to the limitations of this section, pay to the spouse or former spouse
of the member, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member,
any part of the amount payable to the spouse o} former spouse under the
division of property upon effective service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired or retainer pay.
(e)(1) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a
member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such
disposable retired or retainer pay.
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which
provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more
than one former spouse from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a
member, such pay shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, firs£served basis. Such court
orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (I)) out of
that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains after the
satisfaction of all court orders which have been previously served.
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under
this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a
month to the same spouse or former spouse from the disposable retired or
retainer pay of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall—
(i) pay to that spouse the least amount ofJ disposable retired or retainer pay directed to be paid during that mAhth by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired or
retainer pay which remains available for payment of such court orders
based on when such court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B)f jof paragraph (4);
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(U) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay that is
equal to the lesser of—
(I) the difference between the largest amount of retired or retainer pay required by any conflicting court order to be paid to the
spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the spouse or
former spouse under clause (i); and
(II) the amoun} of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains available for payment of any conflicting court order based
on when such court order was effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and
(iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of
that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less any amount paid
during such month pursuant to legal process served under section 459
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid during
such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this section, other than such conflicting court orders) minus—
(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid under
clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer.pay retained
under clause (ii).
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause
(ii) of subparagraph (a) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a
court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being
provide^ "with such an ordei, the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in
accordance with the order.
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section
and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 659), both of which provide for payments during a month
from the retired or retainer pay of the same member, such court orders and
legal process shall be satisfied on a first-come, first-serve basis. Such court
orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to
such orders and legal process and which remain available in accordance
with the limitations of paragraph (I) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal
process which have been previously served.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the
disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court order? pursuant to this section and all legal processes
pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 659) with
respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of the disposable retired or
retainer pay payable to such member.
(5) A jcourt order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the paymept of an amount of disposable retired or retainer
pay wfuch exceeds the amount of such pay available for payment because of
the limjt'set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously served
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court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for' payment of an amount of
disposable retired or retainer pay that exceeds the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not
be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However,
such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by the payment to the spouse or former spouse of the maximum
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay permitted under paragraph (1)
and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed jto relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required
by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in the maximum
amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph
(4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may he enforced by any
means available under law other than the means provided under this section
in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1)
has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid.
(0(1) The United States and any officer or employee of the United States
shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from retired or retainer pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse? pursuant to a court order
that is regular on its face if such payment is made in accordance with this
section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (h).
(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations
prescribed pursuant to subsection (h), has the duty to respond to interrogatories shall not be subject under any law to any .disciplinary action or civil
or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of/ any disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories, j
(g) A person receiving effective service of a court order under this section
shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the date on which
effective service is made, send a written notice of jisuch court order (together
with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court order at his
last known address.
(h) The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the
administration of this section.
(Added Pub.L. 97-252, Title X, § 1002(a), Sept. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730.)
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Note 1
is classified to section 3402(1) qf Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
The Soldiers* and Sailors* Civil* Relief Act
of 1940. referred to in subsec. (b)OXD). »
Act Oct.| 17. 1940. c. 888. 54 ; Stat. 1178.
which is Classified generally to section 501 «
seq. of the Appendix to Title 50, War and
National ,Defense. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 501
of the Appendix to Title 50, and Tables volume.
|
Effective Date: Transition Provisions.
Section 1006 of Pub.L. 97-252 provided that:
"(a) The amendments made by this *' l ' e
[enacting this section and sections I072(2)(n,
1086(c)(3), and 1447(6)-(10) and amending
sections 1448(a)(3)(A). (B). (b). and 1450(a)
(4), (0 oC tfus title and enacting provisions set
out as notes under section 1401 of this title
and this section] shall take effect on the first
day of trie first month (Feb. 1. 1983J which
begins 'more than one hundred and twenty
days after the date of the enactment of this
title (Sept. 8. 1982].

531, Title IV. as added Jan. 4, 1975, Pub.L.
9 3 - 6 4 7 , §){l01(a), *8 Stat. 2357. and
amended, and are classified to sections 662
and 659, respectively, of Title 42, The Public
Health and Welfare.
'Ci
Section 34020) of the Internal Revenue
Code of I 9 & referred to in subsec (a)(4)(D).
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•'(d) The amendments made by section
1004 of this title (enacting sections I072(2XF)
and 1086(cX3) and amending section 1076(b)
of this title] and the provisions of section
1005 of this title (set out as a note under section 1408 of this title] shall apply in the case
of any former spouse of a member or former
member of the uniformed services only if the
final decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment of the marriage of the former spouse
and such member or former member is dated
on or after the effective date (Feb. I, 1983.
provided in subsec. (a) ] of such amendments.
"(e) For the purposes of this section—
"(I) the term 'court order* has the same
meaning as provided in section 1408(a)(2)
of title 10. United Slates Code (subsec. (a)
(2) of this section] (as added by section
1002 of this title);
"(2) the term 'former spouse* has the
same meaning as provided in section
1408(a)(6) of such title (subsec. (a)(6) of
this section] (as added by section 1002 of
this title); and

"(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title
10. United States Code (subsec '(d) of this
section], as added by section 1002(a), shall
apply only" with respect to payments of retired
or retainer pay for periods beginning on of after the effective date of this title (Feb. 1.
1983, provided in subsec. (a) ], but without
regard to ihc date of any court order. However, in the case of a court order that became
final before June 26, 1981, payments under
such subsection may only be made in accordance with such order as in effect on such
date and without regard to any subsequent
modifications.
j

Commissary and Exchange Privileges.
Section 1005 of Pub.L. 97-252 provided that:

"(c) The amendments made by section
1003 of this title (enacting section 1447(6) to
(10) and amending sections 1448(a)(3)(A),
(B). (b) and M50(aX4). ( 0 of this title] shall
apply to persons who become eligible to P ar *
ticipate in the Survivor Benefit Plan provided
for in subchapter II of chapter 73'pf title 1°,
United Slates Code, (section 1447 et $eq. of
this title],! before, on, or after the effective
date of such amendments (Feb. 1. 1983, provided in subsec. (a) ].

"The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to provide that an unremarried former spouse described in subparagraph (F)(i) of section
1072(2) of title 10, United States Code (section l072(2XF)(i) of this title] (as added by
section 1004), is entitled to commissary and
post exchange privileges to the same extent
and on the same basis as the surviving spouse
of a retired member of the uniformed services.**

Historical Note
References In Text. Section 462 of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)
n
( )(i). (ii). and section 459 of that Act, referred to in subsec.' (eX3XA)(iii)„ (4XA), (B).
(5) and (6), are sections 462 of Act Aug. 14,
1935. c. 531. Title IV, as added May 23.
1977, Pub.L. 95-30. Title V, § 501(d). 91
Stat. 159, and 459 of Act Aug. 14, 1935, c
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**(3) the term 'uniformed services' has
the same meaning as provided in section
1408(a)(7) of such title (subsec. (a)(7) of
this section] (as added by section 1002 of
this title).*'
Short Title. For Short Title of Pub.L.
97-252. Title X. Sept. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730,
constituting - F O R M E R SPOUSES' PROTECTION" provisions, see Short Title of
1982 Amendments note set out under section
1401 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Offsets against retired pay 2
Retroactive effect of court dcctsloos

t.

Retroactive effect of court decisions
Eveij'Xthis section should be',given prospective'ripplication only where event which

triggered trial court's granting of relief, granting of certiorari in case In which Supreme
Court had held that military retirement pensions were not subject to division as community property, was not itself change in law, at
time motion to set aside interlocutory judgment was before trial court there was no
change of law sufficient to permit husband to
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(B) The term "senior enlisted njkmber" means any of the following:
(i) Sergeant Major of the Ar^ny.
(ID Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy,
(ill) Chief Master Sergeant of jthe Air Force.
(lv) Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps,
(v) Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard.
(Added Pub.L. 99-348, Title 1, f 104(b), July 1,1986,100 Stat 686, and amended Pub.L. 100-180,
Div. A, Title V, § 512(d)(2), Title XIII, i 1314(b)(6), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat 1090, 1175; Pub.L
100-456, Div. A, Title XII, § 1233(c). Sept 29, 1988, 102 Stat 2057.)
References In Text. Section 16 of the Coast
and Geodetic Survey Commissioned Officers* Act
of 1948, referred to in subsec. (g). is classified to
section 853* of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters
Section 210(g) of the Public Health Seivtce Act,
referred to in subsec. (h), is classified to section
211(g) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.
Section 211(a) of the Public Health Service Act,
referred to in subsec. (h). is classified to section
212( ) of Title 42
1987 Amendment.
Subsec. (d).
Pub.L.
100-180, $ 512(dX2XA). substituted "section
6151 or 6334 of this title" for "section 6151 of this
title".

Pub.L. 100-180, § 5U(dX2XB). added item in
table relating to section 6334.
<{|ubsec. (i). Pub.L. 100-180. § 1314(b)(6)(A),
inserted "and Vice Chairmen" following "for formc
F Chairmen" in subsection catchline.
$ubsec. 0X1). Pub.L
100-180.
$ 1314(b)(6)(B), inserted "or Vice Chairman" following "served as Chairman".
P r | o r Provisions. A prior section 1406, Added
£ £ L. 89-652 § 2(1), Oct. 14, 1966, 80 Stat
* » • r c , a t , n « l o bmiUtion. on revocation of retired
pay w
' " r e d e s I 8 n a , e d as section 1338 of this title.
Legislative History. For legislative history and
purpose of Pub.L. 100-180. see 1987 U.S.Code
Cong, and Adm.News. p. 1018. See. also. Pub.L.
100-456, 1988 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News. p.
2503.

§ 1407. Retired pay base for members whi} first became members after September 7, 1980: high-36 month average
(a) Use of retired pay base in computing retired pay.—The retired pay or
retainer pay of any person entitled to that bay who first became a member of a
uniformed service after September 7,1980, is Computed using the retired pay base or
retainer pay base determined under this section.
(b) High-three average—The retired pay iase or retainer pay base of a member
under this section is the member's high-three1 average determined under subsection
(c).
(c) Computation of high-three average.-^
(1) Formula.—For the purposes of this section, a member's high-three average is the amount equal to—
J!
(A) the total amount of monthly (basic pay to which the member was
entitled for the member's high-36 mtfnths, divided by
(B) 36.
(2) High-36 months defined.—
(A) General rule.—A member's high-86 months are the 36 months out of
all the months of active duty served by the member as a member of a
uniformed service for which the monthly basic pay to which the member
was entitled was the highest
(B) Rule for non-regular service retirees.—In the case of a member who
is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title or under
chapter 67 of this title, a member's high-36 months are the 36 months out of
all the months the member was a member of a uniformed service before
becoming entitled to retired pay for which the monthly basic pay to which
the member would have been entitled had he served on active duty during
those months was the highest
jj!
(d) Limitation for enlisted members retiring with less than 30 years' service.—
In the case of a member who is retired under Section 8914 or 8914 of this title or who
is transferred to the Fleet Reserve or Fleets Marine Corps Reserve under section
6330 of this title, the member's high-36 averaWe shall be computed using only rates
of basic pay applicable to months of acting duty of the member as an enlisted
member.
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(e) Special rules for short-term disability retirees.—
(1) Members entitled to retired pay under section 1201 or 1202.—In the case
of a member who—
(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1201 or 1202 of this title; and
(B) served on active duty for less than 36 months,
the months (including any fraction thereof) that the member served on active duty
shall be deemed to be the member's high-36 months.
(2)' {Members entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205.—In the case
of a member who—
,.(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title; and
1(B) was a member of a uniformed service for less than 36 months,
the month!
hjs (including any fraction thereof) that the member was such a member
shall be deemed to be the member's high-36 months.

n

(O Special rule for members retiring with non-regular service.—
(1) Disability retirement.—In the case of a member of a uniformed service
who is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title (relating to
members on active duty for 30 days or less), the high-36 average is determined
as \i the member served on active duty and was entitled to basic pay for the
member's high-36 months.
(2) Chapter 67 retirement.—In the case of a person who is entitled to retired
pay under section 1331 of this title (relating to retired pay for non-regular
service), the person's high-36 average is determined as if the person served on
active duty and was entitled to basic pay for the person's high-36 months.
(g) Definition.—In this section, the term "years of creditable service" means the
number of years of service creditable to a member in computing the member's
retired or retainer pay (including V« of a year for each full month of service that is
in addition to the number of full years of service of the member).
(Added P,ub,L 99-348, Title I, f 104(b), July 1, 1986. 100 Stat 689.)
Prior Provisions. A prior section 1407, Added
Pub.L. 96-342, Tide VIII, fi 813(a)(1). Sept. 8.
1980. 94 Stat: 1100. and amended Pub.L. 96-513.
Tule I, § 113(c), Title V, {§ 501(21), 511(53),
Dec. 12. 1980. 94 Stat. 2877. 2908. 2925, which
related to determination of retired pay base, was
repealed by Pub L. 99-348, Title I, § 104(b), July
1, 1986, 100 Stat. 686.

Notes of Decisions
1. Computation
_
. ..
. . , J J .
#
Erroneous payments should not be included in
computation of « service member's retired pay
base, for purposes of computing raVcntitlement.
under this section. 1983, 62 Comp.Gen. 157.

§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders
(a) In this section:
[See main volume for text of (J) J
(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved
property settlement incident to such a decree (including a final decree modifying
the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation, or a court' ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement
incident to such previously issued decree), which—
[See main volume for text of (A) and (B)]
C) in the case of a (division of property, specifically provides for the
p'avment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable
mired or retainer pay/ from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a
member to the spouse or former spouse of that member.
1
[See main volume for text of (3)]
(4) yDisposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly retired or
retainer pay to which a member is entitled less amounts which—
[See main volume for text of (A) to (C)J
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(D) are withheld under section 3402(0 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (26 U.S.C. 3402(0) if such member presents evidence of a tax obligation
which supports such withholding;
(E) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of
this title, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that
chapter computed using the percentage of the member's disability on the
date when the member was retired (or the date on which the member's
name was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or
[See main volume for text\pf(F)t

(5) and (6)]

(b) For the purposes of this section—
jj
(1) service of a court order is effective |f—
[See main volume for taxi of (A) and (B)]
(C) the court drder or other documents served with the court order
identify the member concerned and include, if possible, the social security
number of such member; and
j
[See main volume for text of (D), (2), (c)J
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of
property, specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable
retired or retainer pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the
member, the Secretary shall make payment^! (subject to the limitations of this
section) from the disposable retired or retainefpay of the member to the spouse or
former spouse in an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and
alimony set forth in the court order and, with respect to a division of property, in the
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay |Specifically provided for in the court
order. In the case of a member entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date
of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than
90 days after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to
receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the court order,
such payments shall begin not later than 90, days after the date on which the
member first becomes entitled to receive retired or retainer pay
[See main volume for text of (2) to (4) J
(5) If a court order described in paragraph \l) provides for a division of property
(including a division of community property) j in addition to an amount of child
support or alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired or retainer
pay as the result of the court's treatment of such pay under subsection (c) as
property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to
the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the
member to the spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount
payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon effective
service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired or
retainer pay.
(eXI) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member
payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired or
retainer pay.
(2) In the event of effective service of more" than one court order which provide
for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more than one former
spouse, the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member shall be used to satisfy
(subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) {such court orders on a first-come,
first-served basis. Such court orders shall be .satisfied (subject to the limitations of
paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which
remains after the satisfaction of all court orders' which have been previously served.
OKA) In the event of effective service ozj conflicting court orders tinker this
section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the
same spouse or former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall—
O) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired or retainer pay
the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any 'such conflicting
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court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired, or retainer pay
which remains available for payment of such court orders based on when such
court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4);
(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay that b equal to the
lesser of—
•f (I) the difference between the largest amount required by any conflicting
\Court order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount
.payable to the spouse or former spouse under clause (i); and
j | (II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains
[available for payment of any conflicting court order based on when such
court order was effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and
Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and
[See main volume for text of (Hi) and

(B)]

(4)(A) |ln the event of effective service of a court order under this section and the
service o( legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
659), both of which provide for payments during a month from the same member,
satisfaction of such court orders and legal process from the retired or retainer pay
of the member shall be on a first-come, first-serve basis. Such court orders and
legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to such orders and
legal process and which remain available in accordance with the limitations of
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the
satisfaction of ail court orders or legal process which have been previously served.
[See main volume for text

of(B)]

(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders
provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposable
retired! or; retainer pay available for payment because of the limit set forth in
paragraph* (I), or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process
previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659),
provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum amount permitted
under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to
be irregular on its face solely, for that reason. However, such order shall be
considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by the payment to the
spouse or former spouse of the maximum amount of disposable retired or retainer
pay permitted under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
[See main volume for text of (6); (f) to (h)J
(As amended Pub.L 98-525, Title VI, \ 643(aHd), Oct. 19, 1984. 98 Stat 2547, 254?; Pub.L
99-661. Div. A, Title VI, § 644(a), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat 3887, as amended Pub.L 100-26.
f 3(3), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat 273; Pub.L 100-26, S 7(hXD, Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat 282.)
Reference* In Text Section 3402(0 of ihe
Intern*! Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in
lubsec («X«XD). is classified to section 34020) of
Title 26, Internal Revenue Code
|
Codification. Section 3(3) of Pub.L! 100-26
made I technical amendment to the directory
language of lection 644<i) of Pub.L 99-661 by
substituting Ttitle 10, United States Code,0* for
"such tillc'7 which amendment required no
change in te*|. Such amendment by section 3 of
Pub.L 100-26 effective as if included in Pub.L
99-661 when]enacted on Nov. 14, 1986,' see section 12(a) of] Pub.L 100-26, set out as a note
«nder section! 774 of this title.
.
19S7 Amendment Subaec. (»X*)fl>). Pub.L
100-26, | 7(h|KI). substituted "Internal Revenue
Code of {»! 916" for Internal Revenue;Code of
19W Amendment Subsec (a)(4). Pub.L
99-661, f :644<aKI), t t r u c k o u t **(oth€f <han the
retired J>*y,jqf a member retired for disability

under chapter 61 of this title)** preceding "less
amounts".
Subsec. <«X<XE)- PubL 99-661, f 644(a)(2).
added subpar. (E). Former subpar. (H). which
read "are deducted as Government life insurance
premiums (not including amounts deducted for
supplemental coverage); or" was struck out
1984 Amendment Subsec (aX2XQ- Pub.L
98-325. f 643(a), added "in the case of a division
of property," before "specifically provides for**.
Subsec. (bXIXO- Pub.L 98-325. f 643(b).
added ", If possible," after "include".
Subsec. (dXl). Pub.L 91-325, f 643(cXI).
substituted "providing for the payment of child
support or alimony or, with respect to a division
of property, specifically providing for the payment
of an amount of the disposable retired or retainer
pay from a member to the spouse or a former
spouse of the member" for "with respect to the
payment of a portion of the retired or retainer pay
of a member to the spouse or a former spouse of
the member" and substituted "in aa amount sufli-

10 § 1408
dent to satisfy the amount of child support and
alimony set forth in the court order and, with
respect to a division of property, in the amount of
disposable retired or retainer pay specifically provided for in the court order" for "specifically
provided for in the court order.** in the first
sentence
Subsec (dX5) Pub L 98-525e f 64J(c)(2).
substituted "child support or alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay as the result of the court's treatment of
such pay under subsection (c) as property of the
member and his spouse the Secretary concerned
shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section)
from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the
member to the spouse or former spouse of the
member, any part" for "disposable retired or retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall, subject
to the limitations of this section, pay to the spouse
or former spouse of the member, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member, any
part"
Subsec (eX2) Pub L 98-525, § 643(d)(1),
substituted "„ the disposable retired or retainer
pay of the member" for "from the disposable
retired or retainer pay of a member, such pay"
before ' shall be used to satisfy '
Subsec
(e)(3)(A)
Pub L
98-525
§ 643(dX2XA), struck out "from the disposable
retired or retainer pay" before "of the same mem
ber"
Subsec
(eX3XAX0
PubL
98-525,
§ 643(dX2XB). substituted "from the member's
disposable retired or retainer pay the least
amount" for "the least amount of disposable re
tired or retainer pay" before "directed to be paid'
Subsec
(eX3XAX"XI)
PubL. 98-525.
§ 643(dX2XQ. struck out "of retired or retainer
pay" before "required by any conflicting"
Subsec
(eX4XA)
PubL
98-525,
§ 643(dX3XA), struck out "the retired or retainer
pay of* before "the same member"
Pub L. 98-525, § 643(d), substituted "satisfaction of such court orders and legal process from
the retired or retainer pay of the members shall
be" for "such court orders and legal process shall
be satisfied" before "on a first-come"
Subsec (eX5) Pub L 98-525, § 643(dX4XA).
struck out "of disposable retired or retainer pay"
in two places in the first sentence
Pub L. 98-525, § 643(dX4)(B), substituted "disposable retired or retainer pay' for "such pay"
before "available for payment" in the first sentence
EfTectlre Date of 1986 Amendment Section
644(b) of PubL. 99-661 provided that "The
amendments made by subsec'ion (a) [amending
subsec (aX4). prec subpar (A) and («X*XE) of
this section] shall apply with respect to court
orders issued after the date of the enactment of
this Act [Nov 14, 1986]"
Effect!™ Date of 1984 Amendment Section
643(e) of PubL 98-525 provided that 9The
amendments made by this section [amending subsees (a), (b), (d) and (e) of this section] shall
apply with respect to court orders for which
effective service (as described in section 1408(bXl)
of title 10, United States Code, as amended by
subsection (b) of this section [subsec. (bXO of this
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section]) is made on or after the date of enactment
of this Act (Oct 19, 1984]"
Effective Dates Transition Provisions. Section 1006 of Pub L 97-252. as amended by Pub
L 98-94, Title I X § 94l(cX4). Sept 24, 1983. 97
Stat. 654, Pub L 98-525. Title VI. § 645(b). Oct
19, 1984, 98 Stat 2549. provided that
fSee main volume for text of (a) to (c)J
"(d) The amendments made by section 1004 of
this title (enacting sections 1072(2XF) and
1Q86(CX3) and amending section 1076(b) of this
tijjje] and the provisions of section 1005 of this
tide [set out as a note under section 1408 of this
title] shall apply in the case of any former spouse
q( a member or former member of the uniformed
sjervices whether the final decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment of the marriage of the former
spouse and such member or former member is
(fated before, on, or after February 1. 1983
''(e) For the purposes of this section—
Jj /See main volume for text of (1) and (2)]
W'O) the term 'uniformed services' has the same
meaning as provided in section 1072 of title 10,
ijjnited States Code (section 1072 of this title]"
i Savings Provisions Reference to law replaced
by Pub L 100-370 to refer to corresponding provision enacted by such public law, regulation
r^ilc, or order in effect under law so replaced to
continue in effect under provision enacted until
repealed, amended or superseded, and action tak
en'or offense committed under law replaced treat
ed as taken or committed under provision enacted,
see section 4 of Pub L 100-370, set out as a note
tinder section 101 of this title
,tCommissary and Exchange Prirllcges Section
1005 of Pub L 97-252 which provided that Secre
tary of Defense prescribe regulations to provide
unremarried former spouse commissary and post
exchange privileges to the same extent and on the
same basis as the surviving spouse of retired mem
ber of the uniformed services, was repealed by
PubL. 100-370, § l(cXS). July 19. 1988 102
Stat 841
Legislative History For legislative history and
purpose of PubL 9S-525, see 1984 U S Code
Cong and Adm News, p 4174 See, also Pub L
99-661, 1986 U S Code Cong and Adm News, p
6413
West's Federal Practice Manual
Extension of pension benefits for spouses of
military personnel, see $ 16897B
Code of Federal Regulations
Former spouse payments from retired pay, see
32 CFR 63 1 et seq
lisjw Review Commentaries
['.Applying Louisiana's community property pnn
ewles to pensions Dian Tooley Arruebarrena, 33
tbyola (La) L Rev 241 (1987)
(.Former spouse payments from retired pay of
uniformed service members Benjamin A Sims,
11, Ariz Bar J 25 (June/July 1986)
1 Partitioning military retirement benefits Map
fhng the post McCarty jungle Justice Robert M
Campbell and M R. Yogi McKclvcy, 49 Tex B J
970 (1986)

Representing the military spouse Meredith J
Cohen. 61 FlaBJ 117 (June 1987).
The trust in marital law Divisibility of a beneficiary spouse's interest on divorce 64 Texas
LRcv 1301 (1986)
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection
Act A pakial return of power Michael E.
Raabe(1983j) II WestStULRev 71
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act of 1982 Problems resulting from its
application] I (1985) 20 U S F L R 83
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection
Act Stephanie K Cardos, Mary V Perry and
Timothy S kinnott, 33 Fed Bar News 33 (1986)
Library References
Armed Services «=»13 5(1)
C J S Anjied Services § 114
Notes of Decisions
Barred proceedings 16
Community property 13
Constitutionality '/•
Court order | 7
Declaratory judgment 17
Delegation of power lb
Disability benefits 9
Discretion of court 14
Disposable benefits 15
Division of retired pay between spouses 4
Entitlement and eligibility 11
Jurisdiction of federal court 5a
Jurisdiction of state court 5
Law governing %
Reopening decision 6
Retroactive effect of section Vi
Ripeness doctrine la
Sufficiency of evidence 12
Ten year requirement 10
Treatment of pension as marital property t
Treatment of retired pay as income 3
*A Retroactive effect of section
Former wife was entitled to relief from divorce
judgment which did not address equitable distribution of former husband's military pension,
where judgment was entered subsequent to United
States Supreme Court ruling that such pensions
were not includable in marital estate for purposes
of equitable distribution and prior to legislative
enactment of this section which, by its terms, was
retroactive to date of the Supreme Court decision
and provided for inclusion of military pensions in
marital estates Castigliont v Castigltoni, 1984,
471 A 2d 809, 192 N J Super 594
'
In enacting this section Congress intended to
obliterate the adverse effect of McCarty upon a
divorced spouse of military personnel by making it
retroactive to* the date of that decision Smith v
Smith. Del Earn Ct 1983, 458 A 2d 711
Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Afct, which permits application of state
divorce laws'to military retired pay, did not prohibit dissolution court's division of disability retired pay and, in any event, even if it did the Act
could not be applied retroactively to an almost
ten-year bid, dissolution decree, which awarded
wife one t half of husband's military retirement

benefits, so as to preclude wife from recovering
one half of husband's military disability retirement
benefits, final dissolution judgment vesting wife's
community property interest in husband's military
retired pay was a property interest that could not
be denied without due process, disagreeing with
In r* Marriage ofCosto, 136 Cal App 3d 781, 203
CalRptr 15 In re Marriage of Stier, 1986, 223
CaLRptr 599, 178 C A 3 d Supp 1205C. 178
C A 3d 42, review denied
For purpose of West's Ann Cal Ctv Code
| 5124, governing modification of community
property settlements to include division of military
retirement benefits, term "final" as applied to
judgmenu or decrees-means final in sense of bang
free from further direct attack, regardless of any
reservation of jurisdiction on pension issue, and,
thus, statute permits modification of judgments
and decrees where parties could not have sought
retroactive application of curative provisions of
Uniformed Services Former Spouses* Protection
Act, 10 U S C A. §§ 1408, 1408(cXD. because
federal legislation was not operative before time
for direct attack had elapsed In re Marriage of
Van Dyke 1985. 218 CalRptr II. 172 C A 3 d
145
This section which allows state courts to treat
disposable retired or retainer pay of retired mem
ber as community properly was retroactive to
date of United States Supreme Court decision in
McCarty, June 26 1981, and was applicable to
case not final on effective date of this section. Feb
1, 1983, poor California decisions relative to
treatment of military pensions as community
property were controlling on all cases not yet
final, whether they were filed before, on, or after
June 26, 1981 In re Marriage of Hopkins, 1983,
191 Cal Rptr 70, 142 C A 3d 350
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection
Act provision allowing retirement pay of service
personnel to be treated as a marital asset [10
U S C A § 1408(cXD] » retroactive to June 26,
1981, the date of the United States Supreme
Court's McCarty decision precluding state courts
from awarding nonmihtary spouses a portion of
military spouse's government pension Keen v
Keen. 1985, 378 N W 2d 612 145 Mich App 824
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection
Act, could be retroactively applied, so as to require husband to pay military pension proceeds to
wife retroactively to date of Supreme Court decision that Act reversed rather than date on which
award was reinstated Thorpe v Thorpe, 1985,
367 N W 2d 233, 123 Wis 2d 424
Retroactive application of Uniform Services
Former Spouses Protection Act [10 U S C A
% 1408], permitting division of military retirement
payments in final dissolution decrees, to dissolution decrees that were final and not appealed
during 20-month interim period between judicial
decuion prohibiting distribution of military retirement payments as part of community property
and passage of Act, did not divest husbands of
any vested rights, particularly where husbands
had been married throughout period prior to rendering of judicial decision when payments were
considered community property Flannagan v
Flannagan, 1985, 709 P 2d 1247, 42 Wash App
214
Application of statute (10 U S C A . f 1408]
allowing division of military retired pay upon
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In the Matter of the Application for the
Discipline of Harold D. KIMMEL, Jr.,
an Attorney at Law of the State of
Minnesota.

Mary E. DELIDUKA, Respondent,

No. Cl-81-955.

No. CO-83-1261.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

April 18, 1984.

April 4, 1984.

v.
George E. DELIDUKA, Appellant

Review Denied July 26, 1984.
ORDER
WHEREAS, by decision of this court
filed July 23, 1982, In re Kimmel, 322
N,W.2d 224 (Minn. 1982), respondent's practice has been restricted to examiner of titles throughout the remainder of his probation in connection with State of Minnesota
v. Harold Dean Kimmel, Washington
County, #4479, Pine County #64-25B;
and
WHEREAS, by order of the Washington
County District Court dated April 2, 1984,
respondent was discharged from probation;
and
WHEREAS, respondent has satisfied all
current Continuing Legal Education requirements and has paid all past, and current attorneyVegistrationfees;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, consistent with the original opinion of this court
and upon the respondent's demonstrated
satisfactory completion of the terms of the
suspension from practice, respondent is reinstated to practice law. Minn.R.Law.Prof.
Resp. 18 is deemed inapplicable to these
proceedings.

JEb&i DistrickXourt^Jttright _ County,
Harold Dahl, J., dissolved marriage and
made property division and support
awards, and spouse appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Sedgwick, J., held that (1)
military retirement benefits are marital
property; (2) award to wife of 50 percent
of husband's military retirement benefits
did not violate Uniform Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act; (3) failure to
award permanent maintenance was not
abuse of discretion; and (4) it was not
abuse of discretion to order parties to pay
their respective attorney fees.
Affirmed and remanded.

1. Divorce <s=»252.3(4)
Military pension benefits are "marital
property" subject to the division on dissolution of marriage. M.S.A. § 518.54, subd. 5.
See publication Words and Phrases
fQr other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Divorce <8=»252„3(4)

Uniform Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act grants states the authority
to treat all disposable retired pay as marital property but limits direct government
payments to former spouses to 50 percent
of disposable retired pay and, hence, where
a nonservice spouse is awarded one-half of
the gross pension, the service spouse is to
pay the excess over the 50 percent of disposable pension payable directly by the federal government to the other spouse. 10
U.S.C.A. § 1408(a)(4), (c, e), (e)(1), (e)(4XB),
(e)(6).
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3. Divorce <s=»252.3(4)
By labeling its disposition of husband's
military pension benefits as a division of
marital property, but structuring installment payments'to former wife over more
than ten years, the dissolution court anticipated Internal Revenue Services treatment
as periodic payments taxable to wife and
deductible by husband, notwithstanding
that tax regulations technically required
husband to pay withholding on entire
amount* "and prohibited;^witKKol3rn%^frohv
direct pension payments to the wife. 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 71, 215.
4. Divorce <s=>253(2), 307
It could not be said that dissolution
court miscalculated former husband's income tax rate where other than pay statements reflecting withholding the husband
made no effort to prove facts concerning
his income tax liabilities and although he
alleged that withholding amounts on pay
stubs did not accurately reflect tax liabilities the substitute figures he offered were
totally unsupported.
5. Divorce <3=>286(6), 312.6(8)
Reviewing court will not disturb dissolution jcourt/sjnaintenance or child support
awards on basis of unsubstantiated claims
and self-serving figures as to a party's
income tax liabilities.
6. Divorce <s=>237
Factors relevant to award of permanent maintenance are length of marriage,
spouse's age, family responsibilities, "lack
of job skills and lack of resources to obtain
further training or education.
7. Divorce <s=>286(3)
Question on appeal is not whether permanent maintenance is appropriate but
whether trial court abused its discretion by
not awarding it
8. Divorce e=>247, 308
Although wife's age, i.e., 48, family
responsibility in caring for four minor children and lack of job skills supported her
plea for permanent maintenance, it was not
abuse of discretion to award spousal maintenance of $100 for three years, and child

support of $900 per month considering
wife's present net income of $714 per
month as newspaper carrier and security
afforded by long-term pay out of retired
husband's military pension.
9. Divorce <s=*223
It was not abuse of discretion to order
each spouse to pay his/her own attorney
fees.
10; Divorce e=>223
Allowance of attorney fees in dissolution cases rests almost entirely in the discretion of the trial court
11. Divorce <3=>286(4)
Award of attorney fees in dissolution
case should not be disturbed absent clear
abuse of discretion.
12. Divorce <3=>227(1)
Although there was no abuse of discretion in requiring each spouse to pay their
respective attorney fees in dissolution proceeding, husband was ordered to pay wife/
$400 for attorney fees on appeal.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Military pensions are marital property as defined by Minn.Stat § 518.54.
2. The Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act grants states authority to treat all disposable retired pay as
marital property, but limits direct government payments to former spouses to 50
percent of disposable retired pay.
3. The trial court properly refused to
consider tax considerations not raised at
trial in calculating the husband's net in-,
come available for maintenance and chilc^
support
4. The trial court's award -of minimal
temporary maintenance was not an abuse
of discretion considering the wife's earning
potential and her share of the njarital property.
5. The trial court's assignment of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion.
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Medard B. Kaisershot, Crystal, for appellant
Marilyn J. Michales, Minneapolis, for respondent

the family meet expenses she took a job as
an adult newspaper carrier. Her net salary from the route is approximately $714
per month.

Heard, considered and decided by FOLEY, PJ., and WOZNIAK and SEDGWICK, JJ.

The Delidukas' debts at the dissolution
totalled $16,701.66. Their only significant
assets were their home and Mr. Deliduka's
military pension.

OPINION
SEDGWICK, Judge.
This is_an*appeal from a dissolution^udg:
ment and from an order denying a new
trial. The husband contends that the trial
court erred by awarding his wife 50 percent of his gross military retirement benefits and by failing to make certain tax
calculations in determining income available for child support and maintenance.
The wife contends that the court abused
its discretion by granting her temporary
rather than permanent maintenance and by
not requiring her husband to pay her attorney fees.
Affirmed as modified.
FACTS
Mary and George Deliduka were divorced in June-1983 after 23 years of marriage.
The Delidukas, ages 48 and 45 respectively,
had seven children. The children, ages 21,
20, 18, 17, 15, 13, and 9, all live with Mrs.
Deliduka. The court granted Mrsc Deliduka custody of all four minor children.
Mr. Deliduka was an officer in the U.S.
Air Force during the Delidukas* marriage.
He retired in 1980 after 20 years of service.
He has a vested interest in a military
retirement pension plan. According to a
retirement pay statement submitted at trial, he receives $1566.46 gross/$1380.04 net
per month from the pension.
Mr. Deliduka now works as a training
coordinator for Trane Sentinel, Inc. Pay
stubs submitted at trial show that he receives $957.85 gross/$731.73 net bi-weekly
from Trane.
Mrs. Deliduka was a full time homemaker from 1960 until 1981. In 1981 to help

The parties dispute the trial court's treatment of military retirement benefits as a
marital asset, its award of spousal maintenance oL^lQ_Q_peiLjnonth for three^ years,
and child support of $900 per month for the
four minor children, with reductions as
each child reaches majority, and attorneys
fees.
ISSUES
1. Are military retirement benefits marital property subject to division between spouses in a dissolution proceeding in Minnesota?
2. Does the trial court's award to the
wife of 50 percent of her husband's
military retirement benefits violate the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by:"
a. failing to take into account tax considerations not raised at trial in calculating Mr« Deliduka's income?
b. failing to award permanent maintenance to a long term homemaker with
four minor children?
c. ordering the parties to pay their
respective attorney fees?
ANALYSIS
[1] 1. Mr. Deliduka contends that the
trial court erred in treating his military
pension benefits as martial property.
Minn.Stat § 518.54, subd. 5, defines marital property as:
property, real or perscmal, including
vested pension benefits or rights;' acquired by the parties, or either of them,
to a dissolution * * * at any time during
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the existence of the marriage relation
The act is new and the United States
between them, (emphasis added)
Supreme Court has not definitively interTherefore, Mr. Deliduka's military pension preted its provisions. A fair reading shows
that the act grants states the authority to
qualifies as marital property.
[2] 2. Appellant also challenges the treat all 2disposable retired pay as marital
award of 50 percent of his gross military property, but limits direct government
pension 6eneffts to hfs wife as a viofatfon j?a&'ff?<f&Jif t? former speuses t<? 5t> percent
of 10 U.S.C. § 1408, the Uniformed Servic- of disposable retired 3pay (65 percent for
es Former Spouses' Protection Act He multiple court orders). That mearts that a
argues that the Act limits the maximum state court wishing to award a, former
portion of military pension benefits a court spouse more than 50 percent of disposable
may award to a *ormer spouse to 50 per- retired pay must order direct government
cent of <<disposaljirmifBa^Syr^I)ispbs^-i •payments-a72(f payments by4 the member.ofble retired pay is gross retired pay less the military to the spouse.
deductions authorized by 10 U.S.C.
In this case the trial court intended to
§ 1408(a)(4).1
award Mrs. Deliduka one half of her hus1.

2.

10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) defines disposable
retired or retainer pay as:
[T]he total monthly retired or retainer pay to
which a member is entitled (other than the
retired pa> of a member retired for disability
under chapter 61 of this title) less amounts
which * * *
(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State,
or local income tax purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is authorized or required
by law and to the extent such amounts withheld are not greater than would be authorized
if such member claimed all dependents to
which he was entitled;

10U.S.C. § 1408(c) grants state courts authority to treat military pensions as military property. I t provides:
Subject to the limitations of this section, a
court may treat disposable retired or retainer
pay payable to a member for pay periods
beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of
the member and his spouse in accordance
with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.

"3. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d) permits direct government
payments to former spouses, subject to certain
limitations. It provides:
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary
concerned of a court order with respect to the
payment of a portion of the retired or retainer
pay of a member to the spouse or a former
spouse of the member, the Secretary shall,
subject to the limitations of this section, make
payments to the spouse or former spouse in
the amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member specifically provided
for in the court order.

*

*

*

*

*

*

(d)(5) If a court order described in paragraph
(1) provides for a division of property (including a division of community property) in addition to an amount of disposable retired or
retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall.

subject to the limitations of this section, pay
to the spouse or former spouse of the member, from the disposable retired or retainer
pay of the member, any part of the amount
payable to the spouse or former spouse under
the division of property upon effective service
of a final court order of garnishment of such
amount from such retired or retainer pay.
10 U.S.C. § 1408(e) specifies the percentage
limitations. § 1408(e)(1) provides:
The total amount of the disposable retired or
retainer pay of a member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such
disposable retired or retainer pay.
And § 1408(e)(4)(D) provides:
j!lc^wiihsiaading..any^pthec provision of law,
the total amount of the disposable retired or;
retainer pay of a mcmbcr*~payable ~by itftf
Secretary concerned under all court orders
pursuant to this section and all legal processes
pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security
Act (42 VS.C. 659) with respect to a member
may not exceed 65 percent of the disposable
retired or retainer pay payable to such member.
4. § 1408(e)(6) provides:"
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
relieve a member of liability for the payment
of alimony, child support, or other payments
required by a court order on the grounds that
payments made out of disposable retired or
retainer pay under this section have been
made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any
means available under law other than the
means provided under this section in any case
in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid land under
section 459 of the Social Security Act (42
U.SoC. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph
(B) of paragraph (4) has been paid.
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band's gross military pension as a division
of marital property. Since the parties had
inadequate resources to permit a lump sum
settlement, the court provided for installment payments to Mrs. Deliduka.
The trial court tried to give Mrs. Deliduka her half of the gross pension by ordering direct government payments to her under 10 ILS.C. § 1408. But, since § 1408
limits direct payments to former spouses to
50 percent of disposable retired pay, direct
payments alone would not result in Mrs.
Deliduka receiving 50 percentafUhe gross*
pension.
The trial court erred only in its method
of disbursing pension payments to the wife.
To guarantee its intended division of marital property, the court, in addition to ordering direct government payments, should
have ordered Mr. Deliduka to make monthly supplemental payments. Mrs. Deliduka
would then receive her ful one-half of the
gross pension—50 percent of the disposable
pension would be paid by the federal
government, and the difference between 50
percent of gross pension and 50 percent of
disposable pension would be made by payments from Mr. Deliduka.
[3] 3. Mr. Deliduka contends that his
income available for maintenance and child,
support was overestimated because the
court presumed that the parties would each
pay income tax on their respective halves
of the pensionc He correctly notes that the
trial court's income calculations were expressly premised upon the Deliduka's each
-paying income taxes on their respective
halves of the military pension. But his
argument that he must pay income tax on
the entire pension, while his wife escapes
all tax liability, is without merit.
Tax regulations technically require him
to pay withholding on the entire amount
and prohibit withholding from direct pension payments to his wife. However, he
will ultimately be liable for income tax only
on his half of the pension. The trial court
properly recognized the nature of the pension asset, i.e., that it was marital property,
but structured its payout as periodic payments for tax purposes. By labeling its

disposition of the pension benefits a division of marital property, but structuring
installment payments over more than 10
years, the trial court anticipated IRS treatment as periodic payments taxable to Mrs*
Deliduka under 26 U.S.C. § 71 and deductible by Mr. Deliduka under 26 U.S.C. § 215.
Mr. Deliduka has confused tax withholding with ultimate tax liability and ignores
the fact that withholding may be adjusted.
A taxpayer has both the ability and the
right, under the withholding tax regulations—to "increase -his-maximum allowable
exemptions to reflect his actual tax obligation, Mr. Deliduka cites no authority for
his argument that he is only entitled to
claim himself and the four minor children
as exemptions.
The trial judge recognized that uncertainties about the application of federal tax
laws and the Uniform Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act could upset his calculations. So his decree specifically invites
Mr. Deliduka to come back to court for
adjustments of support and maintenance
should he have to pay income tax on more
than his one-half share of the pension. If,
after consulting a tax attorney or accountants the -planned division of-tax liabilities
proves impossible, Mr. Deliduka can return
the matter to the trial court for modification of maintenance and child support If
he does, it will be his obligation to prove
that the tax treatment carefully considered
by the trial court to give this family the
maximum monetary benefit from the pension division will not work.
[4] 3a. Mr. Deliduka's claim that the
trial court miscalculated his income tax
rate is also unsubstantiated. Other than
pay statements reflecting withholding for
taxQs, he made no effort to provide facts to
the trial court concerning his income ta)c
liabilities. In a motion for amended findings he alleged that the withholding
amounts on the pay stubs did not accurai&»
ly reflect his tax liabilities and offered new
figures totally unsupported by the trial
record. On appeal he made spurious arguments on the effect of the tax regulations.
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[5] We will not disturb the trial court's
maintenance or child support awards on the
basis of unsubstantiated claims and self
serving figures as to a party's income tax
liabilities. The trial court's net income
computations are supported by the evidence presented at trial and are not clearly
erroneous. Therefore, they must stand.
3b. Mrs. Deliduka argues that the
court's award of only $100 per month temporary maintenance for three years, and its
failure £p_ grant permanent maintenance
constitutes abuse of discfi&diTun'dSfiVIinYir
Stat § 518.552.
[6] The length of the marriage, Mrs.
Deliduka's age, her family responsibilities,
her lack of job skills, and her lack of resources to obtain further training or education all support her plea for permanent
maintenance.
[7,8] But the question upon appeal is
not whether permanent maintenance would
be appropriate, tut whether the trial court
•abused its discretion by not awarding it
The court's minimal maintenance award for
a limited period was not an abuse of discretion considering Mrs. Deliduka's present
earnings and the security she is_afforded
by the long-term payout of *tEe~npensfon
asset.
[9-11] 3c. Mrs. Deliduka also contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by
not requiring her husband to pay her attorney fees. The court's order that the parties pay their own attorney fees was within
its discretionary power. Allowance of attorney fees in dissolution cases rests almost entirely in the discretion of the trial
court. Solon v. Solon, 255 N.W.2d 395
(Minn.1977). An award should not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion.
Davis v. Davis, 306 Minn. 536, 235 N.W.2d
836 (1975).
DECISION
The decision of the trial court is affirmed
and remanded to the trial court with instructions to make the following modifications:
Mr. Deliduka is hereby ordered to:

1. serve notice on the appropriate
government agency consistent with, the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982) to provide for direct monthly payments to Mrs.
Deliduka of 50 percent of his disposible
retired pay.
2. adjust income tax withholding on the
military pension by taking the maximum
allowable exemptions resulting in withholding reflecting his tax obligation on 50 percent of the gross pension.
3. make monthly payments to Mrs. Deliduka of a sum totaling 50 percent of his
gross military retirement pay less 50 percent of disposible retired pay.
[12] In addition, Mr. Deliduka is hereby
ordered to pay Mrs. Deliduka $400 for attorney fees on appeal.
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Following declaratory judgment determining that insurer did not provide coverage for certain automobile ownecj by judgment debtor, which automobile was being
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which judgment arose, judgment? creditors
served a garnishment summon! upon the
insurer and moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint making the insurer a

